Transcript
Claims
  • Unknown A
    The US is not firing the first nukes. Right, we know that. Is Russia going to fire the first nukes for Ukraine?
    (0:00:00)
  • Unknown B
    No. No. I mean, no head of state wants to be the first to launch, to press the red button. The reputation and legacy that leaves behind. Right. Putin is the, Putin is wanting to be seen as the, as the savior of Russia, not its absolute destruction. So it goes against everything that he stands for.
    (0:00:05)
  • Unknown A
    Why do we expect them to show any restraint at all in the future when they've gotten every single thing they want?
    (0:00:22)
  • Unknown B
    No, I agree with you. The Trump administration is, I mean at this point, I do think he's just deliberately giving into all of Putin's maximist demands. I don't understand how they try to frame it as though this is some kind of show of strength by the Trump administration.
    (0:00:26)
  • Unknown A
    Yeah. When we're just bullying the side that's already like the under the severe underdog and everything.
    (0:00:38)
  • Unknown B
    I'm curious what you think about all this.
    (0:00:45)
  • Unknown A
    I mean I'm, I, that's a very broad question. Give me something more. I guess in general, I guess, I mean there's a lot of feelings. I'm, in some sense I'm, I'm confused, I guess I don't know what it's like. What's your country of origin, do you say?
    (0:00:50)
  • Unknown B
    Well, I'm half English and Russian, so I'm a weird blend of both sides of this situation, if you want to put it like that.
    (0:01:06)
  • Unknown A
    Gotcha. Gotcha. I'm so in the, in the United States you have a lot of different groups of people obviously. My mom comes from Cuba and Cubans were one of the only Hispanic demographics in the United States or Latino or whatever you call, I don't know. That were super conservative for a variety of reasons. Mainly having to do with a lot of Cubans leaving Castro. Are leaving Cuba. Didn't like Castro. A lot of Cubans identify very strongly with conservatives as a result of like the Bay of Pigs as a result of things like that. Angelus. So Cubans are like very conservative. My mom was in the Air Force and she had very strong feelings about the United States and fighting against Russia and communist China and Cold War. So my parents grew up as much as you ever can be like a die hard America are the, the defenders of freedom and liberty around the world.
    (0:01:15)
  • Unknown A
    To see my mom tell me that like we have no business being in Ukraine. We should be doing anything over there. They have biolabs cv. You don't understand. It's like, oh wow, it's such an insane turnabout for me, that. And that's just, yeah. I don't know, to see the conservative party of the neocons who used to be like the hawkish wing, I guess, in the United States, just become so tepid and weak.
    (0:02:07)
  • Unknown B
    And when you have Mike Pence making reasonable points about how outlandish J.D. vance was on Friday, you know, how far the Overton window. Right. The way that we interpret political ideology has shifted. I was pretty deplored by Mike Pence in the past, but he comes off as still having basic principles, the basic principles that underline what we in the west quote, unquote, you know, try to preach around the world. And it's the sell out of those principles, I think, by this new Trump administration so much more than this first one, which is, I think such a, such a kicker for so many people, if that makes sense. I knew the meeting was going to, if we go specifically meeting, for example, I don't know what your viewers and you might have felt about it, but I knew that there was an inevitability that it would derail.
    (0:02:32)
  • Unknown B
    What I didn't expect was for it to be as fast and as hard if that makes intense as it did. I do have some concerns or issues with the way Zelenskyy tried to navigate it, but ultimately it was Vance who for me was the catalyst in so much of it. Trump doesn't really care about Ukraine. If he can get a deal, then he'll do it, but he doesn't really give a shit. Vance as an actual, I think, antipathy towards Zelenskyy personally and Ukraine's whole, you know, what this stands for in his idea of Manga America. And I think also he used there's an opportunity to really leverage his Brandt.
    (0:03:28)
  • Unknown A
    Right.
    (0:04:12)
  • Unknown B
    So they'll see him as the new MAGA adoptee. Right. He'll inherit the MAGA movement and sort of, you know, people are saying he'll be the Next President in 2029. Perish of thought. Right. But yeah, sorry, go on.
    (0:04:13)
  • Unknown A
    Yeah, I mean, I don't know about Vince maybe. One thing I don't like is the lowering of standards on Trump though. If you had an adult who was lounging near a pool and, you know, 25 year old guy drinking a beer and a child who's 3 years old would waddle by him and fall into a pool in front of him, he would just sit there, you know, drinking beer, watching the child drown and somebody would come by and go, yo, what the. Nobody would accept as an excuse for the guy to be like, you know, what am I gonna do? I don't like this idea that Trump gets an infinite pass on being such a weak, feckless, worthless leader just because. Lol. It's Trump. Like, what is the. I don't think it's.
    (0:04:24)
  • Unknown B
    That's not what I.
    (0:05:04)
  • Unknown A
    Because Trump himself said, I think, like, what are you gonna do? You know, like, you know, they're a nuclear superpower, okay, so is the United States. Why is it that we approach international negotiation against Russia? Like, where these weak, spineless can't do anything? Like we have no power at all? Like, why would you even ask the United States to help sell a peace deal if the U.S. just go, well, I don't know. World War Three, nuclear weapons, LOL. And that's it. Like, why wouldn't we say the exact same thing? Invaded Poland. Like, what's the.
    (0:05:08)
  • Unknown B
    Yeah, but I think you're trying to apply principles to someone who's just never going to huff them. Trump's never going to be like that. So it's pointless even trying to exercise that thought.
    (0:05:34)
  • Unknown A
    Well, sure, but then the next question is like, how brutally and how quickly can Europe eject the United States of America from its vision of a coherent, I guess like world policy?
    (0:05:43)
  • Unknown B
    Because this is my main focus, which is what Europe does now. I, you know, look, no offense, but I am first and foremost European and I love, you know, the good Americans like yourself and the ones who are protesting France in Vermont to the point that he had to get of his hotel and go to undisclosed locations. I love that.
    (0:05:53)
  • Unknown A
    Go.
    (0:06:14)
  • Unknown B
    Americans like that, right? I love that. Stand up and fight. But I, you know, at the end of the day, we have to, at this point, Europe needs to get off its ass, stop being shocked, stop being outraged, stop being triggered. And we need to be pragmatic and action orientated. We have to treat every future situation as a worst case scenario. Now in the United States, I hate to say that, but we do because at the drop of a hat, Trump can pull the plug on so much shit. And this is a huge critique I have of the Europeans, which is we have been complacent and entitled for far too long. The one thing I do agree with Trump is that the US has provided security assurances for the Europeans, which did freeload and to our own impediment, right, to our own detriment.
    (0:06:14)
  • Unknown A
    Freeload how though the United States gets a lot out of access to European markets, out of the ability to trade insecurity. But security is not just for security. I agree with you 100% that Europeans are a bunch of horrible, worthless freeloaders. If we're only talking about security. But we're not only talking about security. We're talking about the fact that I can order a product from. From India, from China, from South. I can order anything from anywhere in the world. And I never have to stop and think, is my vessel that I ordered something that's something you shouldn't be common weird. Or is there, like, trade routes that are blocked right now? I've never had to think about this as an American in my entire life. And the fact that Europe has been able to develop as economically heavily as it has in the Shadow World War II, it recovered tremendously.
    (0:07:07)
  • Unknown A
    Germany today is a manufacturing power. All these things have happened under the guidance of the American security. And it's better in the United States as well. It's not like when we separate, it's not like you guys are gonna be better off, you're gonna be worse off. And America's goers are, for everybody, just made worse off by this happening. I think.
    (0:07:50)
  • Unknown B
    Yeah, I think there's a distinction there, right. I'm the first to indicate that the role of international aid, be it foreign aid or developmental aid or whatever type of aid, right, that was very much at the benefit of the United States. It led to the three of the most powerful and prosperous economies in history, Germany, South Korea and Japan, all of which are America's biggest trading partners. So, of course. But I think there's a slight distinction between the historical comparisons in the here and now in terms of that the eu, the Europeans, have been a little bit too negligent in their investments on the road, negligent in terms of their own security capacity. We've neglected our militaries to such an extent, particularly in the past 30 years, since the end of the Cold War. And it wasn't just me who said this. Joseph Borrell, who's a former foreign minister of the eu, said very simply, the Europeans have been too long reliant on US security assurances, cheap energy from Russia and big markets from China.
    (0:08:06)
  • Unknown B
    So the point I'm making is that Europe needs to get the hell up, wake up, and we need to take ownership. My concern is that whilst we have the capacity to do that, we always seem to fall back into this lapse of judgment that actually, maybe we don't need to be too worried about it. But, like, it's make or break time, guys. We've got to do something about it. And also the time horizon, right? But at the time it takes for Europe to get shit Together, it's still time for Putin to remilitarize and be a genuine threat. Right. I don't like the villainization of Russia in every form, but unfortunately it's run by a guy who wants to see the destruction of democracy and Western values which you apply, you know, as a European value. So I don't know. I mean, I could continue, but I.
    (0:09:06)
  • Unknown A
    Mean, I can still. Yeah, I mean, the issue is that not to. No, I will be very American. Okay, you fucking Europeans. Listen, when you guys all have armies, all you do is kill each other. You have to do it constantly. Prior to World War II, prior World War I, you get every European country army, you get another 100 years war, you got another, you got another Fourth Reich, you've got more people fighting all the time, constantly. I think that after the fall of the Soviet Union, people were worried that Europe would fall into that trend of everybody fighting each other again. And I think especially the Balkans, Yugoslavia, like, you're like, oh boy, here we go. But it didn't really happen. I think that the United States providing this like, friendly security umbrella where people are like, well, you know, the US Runs ship militarily, so what are we gonna do, I guess, to build economically in trade?
    (0:09:49)
  • Unknown A
    I feel like that paradigm is better for the United States. Obviously, it's better for Europe. I would say, like, you're talking about the benefits of Europeans to militarize. When you say Europe needs militarized, you said you're half Russian, half British. What does that even mean now? Because the UK is not even part of the European Union, so it's gonna be the own British Army. You're never having an EU army. Right. I think that the right and the left Euro skeptics would literally go into seizures if the EU started to form some kind of like military. So there wouldn't be a really? You think so?
    (0:10:30)
  • Unknown B
    Well, I think, look, I mean, you know, the events on Friday are such a inflection point, right. As I've made several videos of this on the channel and stuff. You know, I don't have to mention that, but like, you know, it's a paradigm shift. It's a fundamental change in everything that we in the west have taken for granted. And the biggest tragedy I find about this is the is maga. Americans are so far in with their idealization of Trump and what he stands for or his idea of what America will be great again, they're losing the forest for the treaties. Right. That they are forgetting that the long term consequences of the destruction of Western unity trust and respect it comes at a huge cost ultimately to America. Sure, you can save money, but ultimately the negatives are there plain to see. But because they don't want to fund Europe anymore.
    (0:10:59)
  • Unknown B
    And it's like Twitter's such a theft pit now that sort of you've got Americans just saying fuck you to everything about, you know, Europe's a shithole and all this sort of stuff. It's like, hang on a minute, some of you American Americans are the ones who constantly say how much you love Europe because of its culture, history and so on. So they're so willing to support Trump that they're even willing to slag off the thing that they used to say how much they love it. So it's just, I think the one thing that Europe is going to have to really think about is, well, having to play Trump literally. They're going to have to really appeal to his interest. Transactional approach to foreign policy. Right. In the case of the Europe has, we can't do everything at once. There is so much that America provides that we just don't have the capacity to, to replicate immediately.
    (0:11:52)
  • Unknown B
    And I'm thinking predominantly sort of logistics, aspects of radar intelligence, that sort of thing. Right. America provides such an overarching security architecture for the Europeans. You know, we have to focus on one thing at a time. And the British are quite there, you pay, aren't even in the eu. How's that going to work? Interoperability is a problem. We've got issues with manpower shortages, we've got a problem with willingness of people to sign up to fight. In hypothetical, there's a fuck ton of shit. So unfortunately, I think Europeans are still going to have to bite the bullet and do some kind of deals with Trump administration on what he considers to be beneficial to America. They're going to have to drop this values based approach towards American interests and clearly put it in. This is why you should deal with us, not the Chinese or the Russians.
    (0:12:37)
  • Unknown B
    You know what I mean? This is a zero sum game. He seems to be it. I don't know if what I'm saying makes sense, but like it's.
    (0:13:25)
  • Unknown A
    Listen, all I'm saying is, okay, 200 years ago, France helped us rebel before. Okay, why don't you guys just help us out again, okay? We gotta get rid of Trump, we gotta get rid of this administration. Wouldn't that be the path of least resistance? No, I mean, I just, it's, I guess it's just sad that we're all just supposed to accept a fundamentally worse world for everybody like that's just, I don't know, like, the idea that, like.
    (0:13:30)
  • Unknown B
    But what choice do we have if you. If you try to throw out Trump? That's not exactly Democratic, is it? I would love nothing more. To see the end of this administration.
    (0:13:56)
  • Unknown A
    Trump is doing right now is Democratic. I think Trump cares about democracy or any part of that, but it's more about the people.
    (0:14:05)
  • Unknown B
    Right. You would have a literal civil war in America if the anti Trump crowd tried to get Trump to be removed from office. Right. That would lead to anarchy in America, because it's like the majority of Americans voted for Trump. Possibly.
    (0:14:12)
  • Unknown A
    But I mean, like that. I mean, we could be looking at a similar situation in Europe as you are right now, with Europe and American skepticism. Right. Where at some point you have to take cards because. And the current path that we're on, the trajectory we're on is just a. I don't even want to say slow erosion or democratic freedom. This current administration, this gets into a lot of domestic legal stuff, has just totally acted with willful disregard of the law and everything. So, yeah, it's pretty insane. It's pretty insane here. Like, we might already be on that path and we just don't realize it yet. Or five years from now, we're like, oh, how could we not notice that we're on a inevitable, you know, crash course to some kind of. Yeah. Horrible domestic event.
    (0:14:26)
  • Unknown B
    Well, think about it, right? What has happened in five weeks of U.S. administration? Five weeks. I knew, again, that this sort of stuff would happen. You know, you'd see a dissolution, but not a complete disintegration. Like, it's. The unraveling is remarkable, I have to be honest. And I don't know. I want to get into the specifics of the books. I'm curious what you thought about individuals. As I said, I deplore varsity more than Trump, but Marco Rubio, I think, is a very interesting case, because the way he was sitting, I don't know if you saw this, but the way he was, like, hunched up in the sea in the Oval Office, it looked like he wanted the ground to swallow him up. Cuban American. He was not exactly. Oh, you can relate to that, right? You're not shy to share your opinions and feelings about a situation.
    (0:15:04)
  • Unknown A
    Yeah. I mean, you ever see that video when Saddam Hussein first comes into power in Iraq and he starts calling up random party members that he's, like, accusing of being traitors to the party? And in the middle of this, where he's calling out random people, one guy, I think, gets up and he's like, long live Saddam Hussein. Long live. And everybody starts getting up and saying it so that everybody's kind of like on his good side. When you look at how Trump runs things, it's basically like that Rubio. I don't know how much you know about Marco Rubio's history in the U.S. rubio is a f ing hawk. This is a hawkish person who is, I would say, just looking at him in his primary performance in 2016, solidly a neocon. And to see him now have to suck at the Trump of everything else.
    (0:15:52)
  • Unknown A
    All of these people have had to fall in line. If you do not fall in line with the Trump agenda, he will destroy you, whatever that means. Taking you to court and suing you. As he's done with pollsters that he doesn't like, as he's done with media companies who publish interviews that he doesn't like, you have to figure out about him. He's doing, I think with CNN and a Kamala Harris interview that he didn't like. He will stick the DOJ on you, which is already. Because Pam Bondi and Bovey, the Attorney General, Deputy AG are now are investigating people. They won't follow orders from the Trump admin. They've already done this with regards to the case being dismissed against Eric Adams in New York. Or he'll just destroy you from the party. He'll talk shit about you constantly. He'll tell people that are primary, you are going to vote you out.
    (0:16:34)
  • Unknown A
    So you have to play ball with Trump or he will apply like seven different dimensions of pressure on you. Everybody was just in that trap, basically. Yeah.
    (0:17:12)
  • Unknown B
    No, I mean, I think he's a. He was one of the least problematic, and I use that wording very specifically, individuals who was, you know, was a.
    (0:17:19)
  • Unknown A
    Shining star in those cabinet picks. And it hurts to say that, but he was absolutely a shining star. Doesn't America. He was one of the only people. Oh, this guy who at least likes this country. I can tell, you know. But yeah, he was like the only one. Yeah, yeah.
    (0:17:30)
  • Unknown B
    Who has reasonable grounds. You know, I had some limited hope about Kellogg as well. General Kellogg is the envoy towards Ukraine. Right. But at the end of the day, the guy is only capable of doing what panties deal, which is trucks. So not ideal. Yeah. No, to Rubio's point is I think the immediate tweet he made sort of stuffing up even more and placating Trump's behavior and France's behavior. So, I mean, Belgravia Square, which is. Well, there's a lot of A lot of foreign money here, so lots of Lamborghinis and stuff, if you heard the noise. But yeah. So, I mean, it's just really. It's really just tragic to see that even the standout guy they say is sort of not going to take a moralistic stance. So I don't know. I mean, I mean, you can't get fired.
    (0:17:42)
  • Unknown A
    You get primary, you get kicked out. Like, that's what happened. Like they, when Doge was carrying through federal agencies, like there were two security guards trying to stop Doge guys going into that. I believe it was the trigger. They just fired both of them.
    (0:18:40)
  • Unknown B
    Speaking of Doge. Yeah. You know, what was Zelensky doing not wearing a suit? Man, that's outrageous, Right? It's not like Moscow, Miranda Modi or Winston Churchill in 1943 haven't wear a suit or anything. Yeah.
    (0:18:52)
  • Unknown A
    When Arafat showed up to sign, was it the Oslor cord? When Arafat showed up in Camp David or whatever, he didn't have a. He has military uniform on you, but.
    (0:19:08)
  • Unknown B
    Yeah, he's wearing fatigue. Yeah, yeah, exactly. So, no, that's what I love about the unconditional supporters of Trump is that they will pick up on literally the most inconsequential aspect. The fact that Zelensky's not in the suit. Is that really the man and obviously the guy who asked the question in the whole thing, you know, do you own a suit? That was clearly a plan. I think that was all deliberately done to trigger Zelenskyy or to, I mean, very simple. I don't know. Do you think it was staged, the whole thing? Do you think it was the ambush?
    (0:19:16)
  • Unknown A
    Honestly, the thing that makes me feel like it was staged the most is when Trump said, I'm glad I let this go on so long so you could see, or whatever. That was a really weird comment to make when I heard, like, wait, what do you mean you're glad that you let this go on so long so people could see?
    (0:19:51)
  • Unknown B
    What?
    (0:20:04)
  • Unknown A
    Yeah, I don't know. It feels stupid. Yeah.
    (0:20:05)
  • Unknown B
    You see, I think it's good for.
    (0:20:07)
  • Unknown A
    The American people to see what's going on. I think it's very important. That's why I kept this going so long. You have to be thankful, like, for him to say that after this blow up is like. Feels so malicious. That's an insanely malicious statement. I don't know, man. Would they really have like, planned the whole thing out? I wouldn't put it past them.
    (0:20:09)
  • Unknown B
    I didn't know he said that.
    (0:20:30)
  • Unknown A
    Yeah, I was near the end.
    (0:20:32)
  • Unknown B
    Yeah.
    (0:20:33)
  • Unknown A
    Trump said that. And I'm glad we let this go on for so long or whatever. I let this come. Glad I let this go on. Yeah. That was a crazy comment to me. It's like, Jesus. But, wow.
    (0:20:33)
  • Unknown B
    Yeah, I didn't know that.
    (0:20:42)
  • Unknown A
    Yeah.
    (0:20:44)
  • Unknown B
    No, I mean, I. I don't know. I feel like obviously they have an agenda. And I vacillated so much in the past 48 hours, I ended up giving up my Friday night because of what happened. I was just so caught up, you know, covering it on YouTube and other social media and stuff. And I'm fascinated, thinking sort of, that this was staged. It wasn't. But ultimately, sort of, either if it partially was, the implications are so significant. I don't think it would have mattered either way, to be honest. I think that if it had just been between Trump and Zelensky, maybe you're going to disagree with this point, but I don't think it would have transcended into what it did.
    (0:20:44)
  • Unknown A
    Probably not, but I think that one issue that people have. I don't know. I don't know if we'll describe this. I don't think there is any deal that Zelensky could or should sign that doesn't include security guarantees. What a waste of fucking time, in my opinion, to put pen to paper on something that doesn't have a security assurance from the United States or anybody in the West. And it sounds like when Zelensky was going to the White House, that Trump had no intention whatsoever of providing any of those security guarantees. So, I mean, privately, maybe it wouldn't have turned into a shouting match or whatever, but, like, I don't know if they would have walked away signing anything unless it had been the weakest deal of, like, just the outline of. An outline of thing that meant nothing anyway.
    (0:21:21)
  • Unknown B
    Yeah, no, I think so. I think what's more interesting is the framing by which the Ukrainian delegation or representatives try to frame it as though sort of the revised versions were somehow improved. Yeah. So there's lots of this. Sorry about that. Yeah. So it's. Yeah, it's just really sad to see that's the extent by which, you know, the Ukrainians have to sort of try and make it look as though they've. They've won the Ukraine, the US delegation round. Right. It's. And to be honest with you, though, I'm not entirely sure what a backstart would look like. This is a popular word that is used in international relations, but it never really has a clear sort of definition, like, sort of, the US continues to be present to reduce NATO presence in Eastern Europe or something like that, whilst the European take up the peacekeeping front lines in actual Ukraine, like it sort of to properly roadmap or blueprint out, if that makes sense, a how it would physically be working in the region.
    (0:22:01)
  • Unknown B
    It's very hard to imagine.
    (0:23:18)
  • Unknown A
    Well, I think, I think the reason why it's hard to imagine, I don't think it's actually that hard to imagine. I think that when somebody, I don't know how big Europe is, somebody asked me a question, they have difficulty, or if you have difficulty feeling what you should do with a particular life decision or particular like business decision. A lot of the times the problem is a first principles problem. You don't actually know, like, what are you, what are you, about, what are you trying to do? You know, on, on a really big macro level, you don't have those questions. Every little minor decision becomes very difficult. I think the reason why it's hard to envision what does the US look like? Does any of this look like it's because Trump has no comprehensive vision, or at least he hasn't expressed a comprehensive vision on what, on anything.
    (0:23:20)
  • Unknown A
    On, like, what is the US's role in Europe? What should a final resolution between Ukraine and Russia look like? What is future involvement of the United States look like in enforcement? Like any of these broader questions, just the broad question, like, what is the United States role in Europe and the rest of the world? I don't think anybody knows the answer to that right now. Right. You've got, you've got a US president who says they don't want to be involved in European security, but they want to own one of the most hot pieces of land in the Middle east, the Gaza Strip. What is the underlying philosophy that's guiding both of these decisions besides chaotic, random, like dipshittery, like, I have no idea, you know?
    (0:23:58)
  • Unknown B
    Well, no, it's funny, it's a paradox, isn't it? Because on the one hand, Trump's talking about isolationism and disengagement from US commitments or activity in the, in the international system. At the same time, he's talking about, you know, physical, well, physically occupying and presiding over a piece of land that has no strategic or materialistic value to the Gaza Strip, but it would be, well, he wants to turn it into a Riviera. Okay, sounds like a, a stand up form of foreign policy for the Trump administration. But also I think it shows you just how much he just. Trump sees the world of great power politics, right? He sees things through mighty's right. And the only way to really get what you want is through show of force. And that expendable states be than Ukraine or any other small state. They're just that. They are pawns in the greater strategic game.
    (0:24:35)
  • Unknown B
    And that's why he's, you know, prioritized talking to Modi over even the British or the French. He's prioritised talking to the Russians and ignoring Ukraine. And it's this stark shift from the Biden administration. I mean, Biden couldn't be any more of a multilateralist. He couldn't be any more of a guy who talks about international corporation and values. And whatever you think about his hypocrisy or inconsistency in policy versus rhetoric, it's, it's, you know, it can be more of a 180, I guess, is what I'm saying. So, yeah, I don't know. I mean, what do you think happens next thing?
    (0:25:29)
  • Unknown A
    I can't predict. It's like, why do you think this guy doing this? What's going on? I have no idea. I can't predict anything. I have absolutely no idea. Everything just feels like chaotic randomness to me. Like there's a world where tomorrow somebody shows Trump a deepfake of Putin, calling him a big sissy pussy baby, and Trump says, you know, we're actually gonna be shipping nuclear weapons to Ukraine so they can defend themselves because we think Ukraine's most important country in the world to maintain it safe. Like, I have no idea. I truly cannot predict. Nothing in this administration makes sense to me. I don't know, like, why are we fighting with Mexico and Canada? I don't know. Why are we terrifying our friends more than China or anybody else? I don't know. I don't. I have no idea. What is he. How do you view the guiding principles of this administration?
    (0:26:09)
  • Unknown A
    How do you ever make a prediction on what you think comes next? I guess in the current Trump administration.
    (0:26:51)
  • Unknown B
    I think that it's the one thing about. The one thing about Trump you can predict is that he will be unpredictable. I know that sounds a bit like, what the hell are you talking about? But in a sense of, you have to make. That's why I think the Europeans are best placed to not take anything for granted anymore. You have to go on the notion that worst case scenario is most likely what could happen. We are seeing the unravelling of the international order that has benefited the United States and the west for the past 80 years and particularly the past 30 years. And it's up to Europe now to decide whether we want to actually take control and ownership of that or whether we're just going to seep back into our old ways of doing it. And I think that, again, that means realism has to.
    (0:26:57)
  • Unknown B
    Doesn't mean you have to set up your principles completely. The EU is a poll for soft power. We are, again, hypocrisy stands of the past. But, like, you know, a lot of people look at the EU as are polling things around climate change or human rights into things like that, and the US is not doing that at the moment. So the EU has to balance.
    (0:27:42)
  • Unknown A
    Okay, so you're saying a thing. And I think the issue with secular popular is realism. We have to be, you know, we have to look at real power politics. We have to look at all these things. Why is it that that is only ever applied to Russia? Why is that never applied to the United States? Like, why is it never the case that. So, for instance, Trump will say any crazy, outlandish thing and all of the maggots, you know, will crawl to slurp out whatever falls out of his body saying, like, oh, you know, well, he's just. That's how he negotiates and blah, blah, blah. Why couldn't Trump tomorrow say, actually, we want the war in Ukraine to end and if it doesn' we're firing nukes on Moscow on the first, we're nuking Moscow. Now, obviously, that'll be insane to say, but why is it that Trump can only say insane things against our allies?
    (0:28:03)
  • Unknown A
    Why can't it be on Russia for once to think like, okay, well, the US Is kind of crazy. Would Trump do it? I'm not sure. Maybe I should proceed with caution. There is no caution whatsoever on the Russian side. The only roadblocks that this administration seems to throw up are in front of allies. Why is.
    (0:28:45)
  • Unknown B
    I'm curious.
    (0:29:04)
  • Unknown A
    Maybe I'm missing something. Can you be a single time where Russia has said something like, ooh, maybe Trump's going to really hard on this one, as opposed to right now, it seems like they're getting every single possible thing they want from the U.S. administration?
    (0:29:04)
  • Unknown B
    Well, I mean, keep in mind that this administration is only being in six weeks, and we did see a fair amount of that from Biden as well. Right. There's been a lot of rhetoric about bringing Ukraine into NATO and that there would always be part of the NATO alliance. But in reality, the Europeans are not on board with that because Ukraine is not ready to join NATO. They are not on the same economic or military level. The interoperability is A problem. Corruption is still a thing in Ukraine.
    (0:29:17)
  • Unknown A
    But the support for Ukraine was unequivocal. From Biden, the biggest rhetoric. No, it wasn't. Shipping weapons, making intelligence available like tribalized Russian material. Sports possible.
    (0:29:46)
  • Unknown B
    But that's a band Aid, isn't it? That doesn't solve the systemic threat that Ukraine feels.
    (0:29:57)
  • Unknown A
    True. Yeah, but they're not in NATO. And deploying US Troops formally against Russia, something that historically we just don't do for, I think for decent reason. But I'm just saying that, like, at the very least, like, Biden was a thorn. If nothing else, it was a huge thorn in Russia's side. Whereas Trump seems eager to capitulate to any Russian demand.
    (0:30:00)
  • Unknown B
    I think it goes back to the sort of. One argument has been put that the US doesn't need to stoop to such levels as the Russians do. They don't need to be as primitive in making such threats to force the capitulation of the Kremlin. I mean, the US Has.
    (0:30:21)
  • Unknown A
    But that's only when you're willing to exercise soft power, which the United States also doesn't do. Reason why you don't have to capitulate in a barbaric way is because you have. Yeah, you've got larger ways to bully people around. But who are we bullying? What did we just announce that we announced tariffs on the eu? We've got our tariffs coming online for Canada and Mexico. What? We're using our soft power to our allies. I don't know why.
    (0:30:39)
  • Unknown B
    No, I know. I know. I think it's also because you just don't want. I think it's a reputational aspect that the US doesn't want to be sort of criticized as doing Putin's policies. Right. But there are a couple of examples where the US has really put forward some suggestions. Right. You can talk about the $350 billion, which is Russian finances, which the Americans have suggested multiple times they would acquire. Excuse me. And haven't. Because they knew that really is a red line for the Russians. Also, when Putin was making threats, he did the partial. Partial quote unquote, which was full mobilization in 2022. That was Putin really, I think, late 2022, about five, six months into the war, just after Ukraine had made the counter offensive in Kharkiv. They were really. The Russians were really on the back foot. He was making renewed nuclear threats.
    (0:31:00)
  • Unknown B
    He was being very, very. That was Putin's rational, as I've seen him in a long time. I think that was. The Americans were really beginning to up the ante and you could see it paying dividends in terms of the military operations that the Ukrainians were managing, but.
    (0:31:56)
  • Unknown A
    Then having to flee Moscow for that mini like two day coup from Prigorda.
    (0:32:10)
  • Unknown B
    Mutiny from Wagner. Yeah, yeah, Mutiny from Wagner.
    (0:32:17)
  • Unknown A
    Yeah.
    (0:32:20)
  • Unknown B
    Well that was obviously a dumpster fire in terms of for some reason Pogosnin thinking that if he got on a plane a few months later, he wouldn't be then taken out in the, in the air by Russian whatever it was.
    (0:32:20)
  • Unknown A
    Really. I thought it was a DI pilot, that's why that plane crashed. But yeah, maybe it was a. Maybe he got in a volunteer, I guess. Yeah, I don't know, man, I wish, I don't know. Just the thing is I don't know what this administration wants. Like I'm curious in a final Ukrainian Russian settlement. I see right now this feels disgusting to say, but I see Ukraine having to give up every occupied territory right now essentially like all of the southeast. Basically, probably, probably assurance is given to Russia that Ukraine won't be allowed to join NATO or maybe even, probably not even the European Union for the next 10 or 20 years. And what is Russia sacrificing? Like what is Russia giving up for this peace deal?
    (0:32:33)
  • Unknown B
    Well, nothing. I mean, I'll put it this way. There's a distinction between what I would prefer and what is more realistic. I'm also just outside Lancaster House, everybody. So this is where the European leaders are meeting or have been for the past like two, three hours. As you can see, it's completely fenced off. It's lovely sunny evening here in London. Yeah, I just wanted to come down. You got camera cruising, there's a Ukraine flag obviously. Yeah, so yeah, anyway, I'm going to wander around and see what we can find. But it's all very fed stuff counts. Terrorism, police and everything around. But anyway, so no, I think that I've got my preference which is obviously 91 borders. Ukraine is a sovereign state and the international rules based order that we've grown accustomed to is respected. But I also think that there's a reality which is that unless the United States is willing to support Ukraine unconditionally and unlimitedly in terms of timescale, I cannot see physically how the Ukrainians can take back the control of the territories that the Russians currently are in.
    (0:33:18)
  • Unknown B
    The Russians are facing an economic pressure. You know, if the Russian economy collapses and Putin faces internal demise, then that might be a little bit more of a potential factor. But as it stands, the Europeans do not have the military capacity to support Ukraine in that endeavor. They just don't have the military outputs. We'd have to reallocate a significant amount of our resources and economy towards wartime production. And I don't think Europeans are willing to do that, despite what they say about supporting Ukraine throughout everything. And so if we're not willing to do that, then we don't just without the US we just don't have that same amount of capacity and therefore the likelihood that Ukraine can somehow in house develop their defensive and offensive capabilities to retake back the territory. Union naturally. Right. In terms of just manpower, that's another issue. Ukraine do have a manpower disadvantage.
    (0:34:16)
  • Unknown B
    I just can't see how they realistically are going to retake the forward left. So sort of do they cut their losses except that the forearm blasts are lost and they just double down in terms of developing security assurances along the existing line of contact.
    (0:35:12)
  • Unknown A
    I just, yeah, I guess the issue is basically that, yeah, I mean it's just, it's a full Russian victory. I don't know what the point is of the. Like, I would prefer the US just not even being involved at all. Then like, I feel like there's a worst case scenario which is the US negotiating a bad or like, like this is worse than a worst case scenario. Like why would the United States be involved in negotiating such an absolute and utter and total surrender? Why we even involved. What's the point? Like, I don't know if you're stupid to me.
    (0:35:28)
  • Unknown B
    Like I think that's the argument of people. I think that's the argument of people who are more, I don't know, pro Putin or Putin apologists. But in that sort of. The American should never have got involved as much as they have because they're likely, you know, we either have to give them Ukraine everything from the beginning or give them, you know, basically it was, it was. Biden's been consistent and reluctant to be committed like either commit fully, but he was still holding back. You know, over time the Ukrainians and javelins, they earned attackers, but each time it came too late, too little, too late. And by that point the Russians were dug in with positions and therefore it was a pointless thing to do.
    (0:35:57)
  • Unknown A
    There's two things going on. So one, so retrospectively I think we can't forget this, but I think and my Ukrainian friends gonna kill me. But I think it was fair in the beginning to be a little bit slow because even though Ukraine is seen as this like really noble good nation now, and I agree with you and Zovsky's awesome guy, Ukraine did have a whole bunch problems related to corruption, everything else prior to. Prior 2014 for sure, and even prior to 2022. So the idea that they're getting invaded and now we're just going to wade so here. Did you get totally deceived? Oh, he's totally disconnected. In the beginning, I can understand not getting everything to Ukraine because we had no idea how they would utilize it. Right. So like I can. I'm a little bit sympathetic in the first few months at least or half year or whatever of like, okay, we'll.
    (0:36:39)
  • Unknown A
    Let's see how they are able to fight. You wouldn't want to turn over a bunch of military stuff. And they end up getting steamrolled anyway because they just don't have the ability to mobilize. Like, nobody really knew what that war would look like despite so many opinions on both sides of it. But then after a couple years, I think that the issue they ran into was Republicans in the United States just didn't want to support Ukraine anymore. And it became a fight on every single piece of legislation then whether or not we were going to bring light more support. Ukraine started to become tied to like border bills in the United States of America. And it's just like ridiculous. So I think that. I don't know, I feel like. I feel like if you're a country and you're fighting with somebody else, the idea that the US is like in the shadows is like behind your opponent.
    (0:37:25)
  • Unknown A
    That should be like a really scary thing. But right now it just seems like a really cuck thing or even it's like a really. It's like good for you. Oh, cool. The US involves. We know that whoever we're fighting against is not gonna be super f Cking cuck because the US Is gonna be involved in anything. They're gonna hold backball. I don't know, it just feels really shitty to me. Like when I say I don't think Yushi involved now, it's not because I don't think they should have ever been involved. It's because now it seems like the US is, you know, Russia has to play real power politics and the US has to play like real coupled politics where we can't do anything and they can do everything. It's like the. I don't know.
    (0:38:02)
  • Unknown B
    Well, this is the problem, right? The anti Ukrainian voices will say that, you know, Russia's winning and the Americans and NATO can't even beat Russia. But sort of they miss completely the point, which is that the Americans aren't actually involved. They're sending weapons indirectly, which is not the Same as American forces actually fighting Russia directly. But we wouldn't ever want to get to that point because that does lead to Armageddon. So sort of the United States is having to play the bigger player by not getting as involved as it could otherwise do. It would. Because it would Crush Russia. Right. 35 countries or whatever, 32 in NATO, and, well, half of them are the same size economically as Russia versus let alone the United States, which is what, 20 times? So, yeah, it's a myth. It's an unfair answer from the beginning.
    (0:38:30)
  • Unknown A
    Right?
    (0:39:22)
  • Unknown B
    It's not a fair argument. It's disingenuous argument from the beginning, rather. So that is part of it. But I also think that the, as I said, I think it goes back to the sort of the tug of war between what some people within Washington wanted to do versus what others felt was too scary. That, you know, the fear of MAD is very much there. And so I think that pulls a lot of Democrats, maybe, maybe not so much as the neocon Republicans or something, into being like, well, we don't want to get too involved. We shouldn't give Ukraine too many weapons because that might antagonize the Russians. But then by not doing so, they're worsening the situational term because the Ukrainians are still going to fight, but they're just going to be at a disadvantage and the whole thing just breaks out, you know what I mean?
    (0:39:22)
  • Unknown B
    So it got to the point, I think, halfway through the war, at least for the past three years, where at that point, no matter how much the Americans gave Ukraine stuff, it was never going to be enough because there was always that sort of hand pulling them back a bit, you know what I mean? Sort of. You know, they were dragging their feet still even a little bit. So, yeah, I think at this point it's not salvageable. I just don't see how, unless Trump does 180 again, and it's like, yes, actually, I'm going to support Ukraine completely because I feel I've been fooled by Putin. Ukraine can somehow come out of this on top. It just doesn't seem realistic. As much as it pains me to say that.
    (0:40:04)
  • Unknown A
    Here's the biggest issue that I have, and I think we answered this at some point historically, right? We're talking about appeasement, right? When people say things like, we're scared of World War 3, we're scared of nuclear whatever, wouldn't it be better to stop this type of behavior or to show Russia that it can't act this way because they know that that's going to happen rather than kind of like tempting them into doing it over and over again. Because when those exact same arguments apply, if Russia decided to invade any of the, you know, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland, like, if Russia wanted to invading a NATO country, why wouldn't those same arguments apply? Why would they expect, you know, any US Presence to be involved in any of these things? Will those exact same arguments be used? I don't understand.
    (0:40:43)
  • Unknown B
    Yeah, I mean, look, I think this is the problem that you, you, you don't want to fall too much into the direction of appeasing someone that you know will exploit you, but equally, you don't want to push it to such an extent that you can't come back from it. Right? So, and I'll give you a personal example of my own internal dilemma about this. In the early days of the war, there was a discussion about the NATO no fly zone. Enforced. No enforced no fly zone by NATO. And I was not sure about that, because if the Russians and the N did engage in the air, that that is a trigger potentially for, you know, heightened escalation. The Russians can claim that NATO shot them down, vice versa, et cetera. And so the point I'm making is that once you, once you go too far, you can't come back from it.
    (0:41:26)
  • Unknown B
    Yeah, but I think that's the restraint thing of the Biden administration. Right?
    (0:42:22)
  • Unknown A
    So I don't like this thinking, because I feel like this thinking legitimizes the saber rattling of nuclear winter. Let's say that that were to happen. And I sympathies, like, it's like, let's say that you do get this. The US Comes in and they, and they big ticket. And they say, no fly zone over Ukraine, end of story. And Russia's like, well, fuck you. Obviously you're not going to fly zone. What are you gonna do? We're start having Russian and American jets shooting each other. And then Russia deploys air forces and the US Says, yeah, we are. And the US Starts shooting stuff down. What's Russia gonna do? Like, Putin. For all the hate that I might have for Putin and anybody else, I don' an actual, like, maniac who's like, all right, I'm gonna start everything this. Like, I think at some point Russia has to say, well, the US Is an illegitimate fighter they're involved in.
    (0:42:26)
  • Unknown A
    This is terrible. We're gonna pull back. Do we really expect, like, the US Is not firing the first nukes. Right? We know that. Is Russia gonna fire the first nukes for Ukraine? I don't think so. And it sends a strong message like.
    (0:43:08)
  • Unknown B
    Okay, well, no, no head of state wants to be the first. No, no, I mean, no head of state wants to be the first to launch, to press the red button. The reputation and legacy that leaves behind. Right. Putin is the. Putin is wanting to be seen as the, as the savior and, you know, redress the rate of Russia, not its absolute destruction. So it goes against everything that he stands for. But, you know, the problem I have is that Russia is more of a rogue state than say, China. So for example, when the Chinese and the, when the North Koreans and Russians signed a strategic partnership in June, the Chinese are very quiet about that because they don't actually want it. They don't want the spotlight on Eastern Asia because, well, that brings attention to their activities in the South China Sea and Taiwan.
    (0:43:18)
  • Unknown B
    You know, they're quite happy to see the chaos in, maybe not complete chaos, but like, you know, they're quite happy to see Russia weaken because it means Russia is more reliant on China and China can effectively, you know, take all of their resources and use them as a bit of a vassal client state. So the Chinese were not happy when they signed that strategic partner because it brings an unnecessary amount of recklessness and unpredictability to the international system that China is a part of. You can talk about there being an anti Western axis, right. The Communists like to talk about the Chinese, Iranians, Russians and North Koreans. But the Chinese are always the slight anomaly there because they are so much bigger and integrated with the system in the way that the Russians and the North Koreans are not.
    (0:44:07)
  • Unknown A
    I feel like trying to understand how to use this soft power is much better too than I guess the US now and Russia as well.
    (0:44:53)
  • Unknown B
    Yeah, yeah, no, they gradualist, they think in decades whilst we think in minutes at this point. Anyway, the point I'm trying to make is that the. Nobody wants to be the first to launch the nukes. And therefore, though technology has changed and my biggest concern always comes back to specifically tactical nukes because if you have a warhead that has a very low yield on a tactical nuclear weapon, you can launch that into the Sea of Azov, the bit east of Crimea, and that would be a big symbolic strike which wouldn't necessarily have any damage in terms of infrastructure, would kill anyone, but it would be such a show of force by the Russians to show you are really pushing us now that like, that's still quite a scary concept. So.
    (0:44:58)
  • Unknown A
    Yeah, but think about what we're saying afterwards, what we're saying, the statement that we've made. The rules that we're writing right now for the international order are if you have nuclear weapons, you can always be the aggressor, regardless of the justification for war, because we are too scared to fight with you. So why would Russia, if they saw an opportunity to flip Poland into another, Belarus into another whatever they want to turn your crane into, into another Georgian annexation, into another Moldova transistor situation, who's to stop Russia from doing it? Because all these Americans are still here. I feel like we're just running up the stairs in our tower, you know, fighting floor by floor by floor until at some point we're after, okay, well, we can't, like, Russia's up to Germany now or they're up to France now. Okay, well, fuck, I guess we gotta do something now.
    (0:45:45)
  • Unknown A
    It's like, well, we should have just done this when it was Georgia or at least when it was Ukraine. Why are we waiting so long? Do we think that Russia is going to say, well, I'm glad that the saber rattling worked here and I was able to get every single thing I wanted to, and now I'm happy. I'm just going to stop right here. This is chill, this is cool. Why do we expect them to show anger, restraint at all in the future when they've gotten every single thing they want?
    (0:46:29)
  • Unknown B
    Yeah, no, I agree with you, mate. You know, the Trump administration is. I mean, at this point, I do think he's just deliberately giving all of. Into all of Putin's maximalist demands. You know, there is a. You know, you could talk about Ukraine not joining NATO again, which I sort of agree with, just because of certain, you know, to protect the NATO project, the European project. That is. So it's realistic. But there are other ways that you can shore up support for Ukraine. Right? And Trump isn't bothering with any of that. And it shows. I mean, to be honest, to take a step back for a second, think about the engagement between the Russians and the Americans. Right? This is not about Ukraine. Ukraine is but a component of a broader resetting of bilateral relations between the two in a way that we haven't really seen done since Trump was in office.
    (0:46:50)
  • Unknown B
    Right? So the US Again, it shows you the real priorities of the Trump administration. And so the nuclear element is something that he talks about worldly, but I don't actually think he's that fearful of it because he's not. He's looking at Putin as a business partner, not as an adversarial head of. My problem with Trump in many ways is that he approaches politics like business. And it just isn't like that. It really isn't driven by just business interests. It's driven by state interests. Sure, but those aren't just based on business interests. Right. And I think he conflates simplifies at all.
    (0:47:37)
  • Unknown A
    I don't even like calling it business. I don't think it's a businessman. I don't think we're making a good deal. But also, real quick, someone's here. Big Bang. Can you point to Big Band? We need to see.
    (0:48:09)
  • Unknown B
    Can I see Big Ben?
    (0:48:18)
  • Unknown A
    I just saw it.
    (0:48:19)
  • Unknown B
    I would have pointed it. I'm walking to Lancaster House, which is where they're holding a meeting.
    (0:48:19)
  • Unknown A
    God damn it. All right. Oh, okay.
    (0:48:23)
  • Unknown B
    I'll walk around. I was literally in front of fucking palace and all that stuff. I can point it out to people if you want. It's getting dark here, so you might. You know, after a while, it'll just be a black camera of me talking.
    (0:48:26)
  • Unknown A
    To you, but that's all right with you.
    (0:48:37)
  • Unknown B
    So, no. Anyway, I wanted to ask you guys, so what would you think is the best approach to this, then? Like, how do we push Russia to the point where we can ensure that they won't resort to nuclear weapons?
    (0:48:42)
  • Unknown A
    Because I think if you've got that.
    (0:48:53)
  • Unknown B
    Answer, you should be running for president, mate.
    (0:48:54)
  • Unknown A
    Well, the issue right now, unfortunately, is I think we've already done irreparable damage to our relationship to the rest of the world, because how the fuck is the world of the United States beyond being a schizophrenic country going from Obama to Trump to Biden back to Trump, it's just insane. So whatever president we get next, even if it's a good president, it's just gonna be crazy. Like, we're just so unreliable in terms of foreign policy outlook. But I would say, and I might be biased coming off my Israeli history studying, but, like, the best thing you can do is to have a very strong, no nonsense policy of, hey, you're not allowed to do this. And if you do do this, the United States is gonna come down on you with a force of a thousand F35 and a blurry you're doing. And then that's your hard line right there.
    (0:48:56)
  • Unknown A
    And if Russia wants to be like, whoa, we're gonna really. Are you really gonna do that? Is Putin gonna say a guy who already was. Was facing mutiny from Wagner, who, You know, I don't know what his actual popularity numbers are, but for an economy that's been strained by war for two years on a country that should have been able to 15 weeks you're pushing the nuclear button. Like, like what do Chinese Russian relations look like if Russia starts threatening nukes? Like is that something that, that even the rest of, you know, BRICS is gonna be on board with? It's China board with? Like, I don't know, I just, I feel like the saber rattling is only done because other people give into it, but the United States stops listening. I think the next step is, I think it's if like this would be the thing I would say, what do you think would be more likely?
    (0:49:40)
  • Unknown A
    Okay, the United States says we changed our mind on Ukraine. We're doing a new no fly zone. And Those are our F35s that now own that sky and you cross the border or you shoot anything, whatever you're getting Bond. Okay, do you think from there is it more likely that Putin says, well, I guess I just have to start nuking shit, or does Putin go, wow, these horrible disgusting Americans and the rest of the world have backstabbed us and they're turned against us. We have no choice but to leave, I guess Ukraine, but I mean the US did this and it's their fault and they pulled out of Ukraine. What do you think is more likely in that point?
    (0:50:20)
  • Unknown B
    Well, that's the million dollar question, because also just before I answer this is Lancaster House or sort of one of the entrances further around there is where most of the vehicles have been going through with the heads of state and delegations. Most of them have left at this point. They've got to get back across to Europe. And Zelenskyy I believe has already left. He's on the way to the to see King Charles for a meeting. So anyway, this is sort of where ground zero today and where Europe really needs to wake up. So yeah, to answer your question very simply, I think that is a million dollar question because if Putin were not to do something in response to that, then that's the end of his legitimacy as president. Because so just real quick on this.
    (0:50:52)
  • Unknown A
    Point, I don't hear to us, I disagree with you, but only because keep in mind this is an offensive operation. I think that if NATO were attacking Russian territory or if the US was attacking like Russia proper, sure, but this is for a Russian invasion. They're just retreating from land that they're invading. Now we can argue that they formally anti parts Ukraine fight. I don't know how much that matters.
    (0:51:39)
  • Unknown B
    Are you talking about NATO actively being on the ground or in the air, so to speak, in Ukraine managing the airspace? Much more like assertive offensively.
    (0:52:00)
  • Unknown A
    No, no, I'm saying that, yeah, I'm saying that it would just be in Ukraine. It would be defensive Ukraine. I'm impossible believing that Putin would be firing nukes for offensive wars.
    (0:52:10)
  • Unknown B
    No, of course he wouldn't. I don't think the Kremlin would do anything in that instance. But again, it's. That is existential for Putin or nearing as about as existential as you can get, because he is. It's about the legitimization of his regime. He's an autocrat, don't forget. And as much as people who shrill for him like to say that democracies are inherently stable, so are autocrats. If you don't have the keys to foundation or keys to power, you know, your financiers, your military supporters and your law enforcement or whatever, you are on shaky ground. And Putin has arguably been the most effective strong man, which is why he's, you know, lauded amongst so many others, like not Netanyahu, sort of sometimes, right, or Erdogan or Belsonaro. And Trump, arguably himself. It's because he's been the most successful person of purging his adversaries, his skeptics, the nihilists, whatever, that he remains so much in power.
    (0:52:21)
  • Unknown A
    And so imagine a deal with the US says. Imagine what the US says. No fly zone over Ukraine. Okay, no fly zone over Ukraine. Here's the deal, all right? If you want this to stop, you can have a 99 year lease for Sebastopol, so you can keep your port there and you can float your ships, whatever, but all the territory goes back to Ukraine. You get to have your lease on Sebastopol, all the sanctions go away, we'll unfreeze your funds or whatever, but this conflict is over. Like, I feel like that's a deal that, you know, Putin has to go back to Russia, licking his wounds a little bit, but their assets unfrozen, they get their sanctions lifted, their economy starts to recover. His oligarchs are happy. You know, he can come away saying like, well, look at what I, at least he has some victory there that he can, that he can point to.
    (0:53:26)
  • Unknown A
    Well, I get all these assets back from the European Union, from the Americans and everything else, and here we are, you know, into the future. Like, I don't know, that just seems much better than letting Putin walk away with a big W from, from this war that justifies all of it. Now he's got three of these, four of these, if you count, you know, intrusion in Syria. They read in point like, look at these great Russian military interventions, everything. Why is not Syria anymore? Because it's about. I don't know.
    (0:54:06)
  • Unknown B
    Well, yeah, that's a good point. So I think to bring in that component as well, which is that if we need to take stock of where Russia is right now, which is for whatever morons say, Russia's winning, they're not. Strategically speaking or grand. Strategically speaking, Russia is doing pretty bad. They've lost Assad. The Iranians are decimated from, well, Hezbollah. So they've lost their effects across the Middle East. North Korea is doing okay, I guess. I mean, not really much is happening over there, but the Russians are facing. The economy's getting really bad. So Putin is not in an ideal position. And so his back is up against the wall quite a lot. And so if he then starts being, you know, even more pressured by the United States in terms of, like, you know, look, we're going to enforce this. No fly zone. This is.
    (0:54:27)
  • Unknown B
    What are you going to do, punk? That is a real. That is something I cannot really predict. I've studied Putin in Russian studies for a while. But to go to that extent, that might be the point where the Russians are like, well, maybe, you know, screw it, Ukraine is expendable.
    (0:55:16)
  • Unknown A
    Yeah, yeah. But Putin can sell it because at least he's got some offers from the west in terms of, well, here for you if you leave. But this would be the type of thing that only the United States could do, which I thought was a cool thing about my country. But right now, the United States is negotiating this peace deal like we're f Cking Albania or whatever. Not to knock on the Albanians, but it's like we have nothing to offer. No firepower, no show for. I don't know, just seems like it.
    (0:55:37)
  • Unknown B
    I'm curious on that point, though, what you and your viewers think. Right about. Because Pro Mag is frame this as being sort of Trump using common sense and a show of thought. He's putting Zelenskyy in his place by treating him disrespectfully. He didn't say thank you enough times. Right. But, like, for anyone of a reasonable mind, it just looks incredibly defeatist. You are giving in to the demands when you run the most powerful conference. Like, well, we don't want to spend any more money. Yeah, that's fair enough. But I don't understand how they try to frame it as though this is some kind of show of strength by the Trump administration. Yeah.
    (0:56:03)
  • Unknown A
    And we're just bullying the side that's already like, the. Under the severe underdog. Everything. Yeah, I don't know, I just, it just, it feels like having, like I said before, like having the US as your ally, like that should be the ultimate fucking fear of the other side that the US has stepped in, has got involved. And I like, well, fuck me. Whereas right now it's just like it means nothing. Like the US just wants to retreat from everything or I guess I would.
    (0:56:38)
  • Unknown B
    Let's, let's be a little bit more. I'm going to start dancing around it a little bit. I think that if the United States were to try to impose some kind of more concentrated, I don't know, no fly zone or more established, like just to push back against the Russians in a sort of more focused effort, I don't think the Russians would actually respond. We've done that each time. Each time given the Ukrainians more. And I think the most recent example was October, November, when the Russians reviewed or revised a nuclear doctrine to basically make it easier for them to launch nukes or put them on high alert. Which is. That's not just pressure, it's a policy shift, however demonstrative it might be, but still more than just words. But I think if the US Continued to apply the pressure up, more sanctions, more methods of trying to bring countries around to dissuade them from trading with Russia, for example, that would.
    (0:57:01)
  • Unknown B
    Then the argument is that the Russian economy is about to implode or go down next year. But I don't know how much Ukraine can last that long given the destruction from within the US towards them as well as the Russia from Putin.
    (0:57:53)
  • Unknown A
    So I think another huge issue is, and I'm not studying on this at all, you know, a million times more, but I think another issue is just that over the past 30 years, the United States doesn't seem to know what its relationship with Russia is. Right. Like, I think Gorbachev was trying to liberalize the Soviet Union quite a bit. The Soviet Union falls, Yeltsin is in and out, Putin's in and out. Like the war on terror happens and we start to get a lot closer to Russia, security wise, but then they invade Georgia and we're not sure. And it just feels like the United States and Russia, I don't know if it's confusion on the US Side, the Russian side, on both sides, if it's an international issue or other forces are at play. But it feels like the United States hasn't made a firm decision.
    (0:58:06)
  • Unknown A
    What is our relationship with Russia? How do we do each other? How should we proceed with that? And without that big question being solved too. It's also hard to figure out, like, you know, what does any future involving both of us look like?
    (0:58:48)
  • Unknown B
    Well, here I'm going to take a slightly different tone maybe, but I do think that there has been an unnecessary demonization of Russia in the past. Not necessarily, but I forget Putin for a second. But like a lot of pop culture in the US is always, you know, the Russians are the evil. They want to destroy the US in our way of life and freedoms and all that sort of stuff. And I do think that the. I don't know if you saw a talk given by a very prominent colonist called Jeffrey Sachs recently in the eu, and some people might hear that name and be like, oh, I don't like him. But he, I think, is quite reasonable in that he acknowledges that the west could have done maybe a better job of engaging Russia earlier on in this whole.
    (0:58:56)
  • Unknown A
    Well, I mean, to be fair, we just came off of like a 50 year, whatever, cold War, of course. I mean, come on, we all watched Rocket Corps, whatever. We all did. We saw the space race. Like, it's pretty hard to come off that and be like, okay, cool, everything chilled out. Like, there was a lot. I mean, I told you, my parents are like big red scare people and they talk about chicom and in the Soviets, like my mom called the Soviet Union up until like 10 years ago, she would still call Russia the Soviet Union. The Soviets are very. So I mean, to be fair.
    (0:59:33)
  • Unknown B
    Yeah.
    (1:00:01)
  • Unknown A
    I mean, it's antagonistic, I agree for sure. But I think it's like understandably so, you know.
    (1:00:01)
  • Unknown B
    Yes and no. Okay. The US did try stuff. Americans who are pro Putin or the pollocists often talk about, you know, not one inch further east because of NATO and this whole promise by Secretary James Baker, I think it was. But that is a false. That is a false representation of Hitler because that's not what happened. There was never any.
    (1:00:06)
  • Unknown A
    It was verbal.
    (1:00:33)
  • Unknown B
    Sure, it might have said some verbal stuff, but there's never any written guarantee.
    (1:00:33)
  • Unknown A
    Okay. Not only that, I'm glad you bring this up because I hate it when people bring that point up. That was referring to the militarization of East Germany. If they did reunification, the idea that NATO wouldn't move any further east didn't make sense when Baker was speaking because there's nowhere east NATO to even move to. The Warsaw Pact was still affected. Everything else, and they got to do the remilitariation of East Germany. They did reunification, which was a big concern, but people pretended that that was some guarantee. Yeah. That NATO would never expand. And I think even Gorbachev himself, and they gave an interview saying, no, of course, there was never, like, any written promise or guarantee or anything like that.
    (1:00:36)
  • Unknown B
    So here's a couple of more fun facts. So, you know, 1997, Clinton's administration established a founding act with NATO as well, trying to better establish, you know, integration or interoperability through scenarios. In the 90s, you know, NATO was a bit of a. Well, I didn't know what it was going to be. It didn't have an identity anymore. The existence of it, the reason of its creation was no longer a thing. So. And then in 2002, they created the Russian NATO Council. So these were effective steps by the US and allies to try to sort of, you know, engage Russia more. Yeah, but the other thing was also, you know, Russia was integrated to NATO through what's known as the Partnership for Peace program. So this is an initiative with Ukraine as well. And technically, the first part of it, these ideas of talking about collective peace through, you know, dealing with counterterrorism, counting our coffee, counterinsurgency, whatever.
    (1:01:09)
  • Unknown B
    And Putin was actually, you know, one of the first allies to say to George Bush, when 9, 11 happened, we're here. We're here to support you. It's insane. And the very last one I make is also actually Russia played to join NATO twice. First in 1954, the Soviet Union, and second as Russia in the late 90s, 2000s, because Putin thought NATO would be a useful counterbalance or vehicle by which to deal with the Chechnya uprisings in the late 90s and in Chechnya and stuff. So the relationship there is completely more complex than people say. It's all about NATO expansionism and destruction of Russia. But, yeah, where do we go from there? Is it the end of NATO?
    (1:02:02)
  • Unknown A
    What do you think? I mean, that's up to Putin, I think. I think Putin should just fire, like, two missiles into Poland. And I think NATO falls apart immediately because the United States is not doing anything. It doesn't feel like it. So who knows?
    (1:02:49)
  • Unknown B
    What would you most like to see done then? What would you like Trump to do?
    (1:03:03)
  • Unknown A
    Would I like Trump die of heart attack? I guess. I don't know. He'd have to fall over and crush your pants on the way down, though. I mean, I don't know. I just. I feel like the United States doesn't have a vision of itself in the world. I feel like the US Has a very negative view of itself. We used to have these competing ideas in the US we had, like, our hawkish party on the right, the Republicans who said, U.S. police.
    (1:03:07)
  • Unknown B
    Good.
    (1:03:29)
  • Unknown A
    And then we had our, like, very far left people who were like, the US Foreign policy, we're always bad. And now everybody switched over to that latter position where the right says, oh, true US Foreign policy is bad and everybody hates America in America. So obviously, beyond Sarah says, having any kind of moral justification for doing anything internationally. And I think that's.
    (1:03:29)
  • Unknown B
    What do you identify as, like, are you. You are liberal, but, like, are you a liberal interventionist? You believe in intervening in countries to encourage democracy? Are you more.
    (1:03:49)
  • Unknown A
    I mean, I think we should intervene just for democracy, but I think in places where, like the United States, I think, should have a very active involvement in European security, I think demonstrably been incredibly successful over the past 30 years. And the idea of just walking away from that for no reason, I think is incredibly silly and stupid. And for the cited reasons that Trump gives is even more stupid. The idea that Europe is scamming us with tariffs and all this stupid nonsense is just. Yeah, it's ridiculous. Just making it worse world for everybody in the West. And like you said, really the winner and all this is China's just sitting back and thinking like, ooh, okay, here we go. Yeah, well, the biggest.
    (1:03:59)
  • Unknown B
    The biggest sort of winner is China, but the biggest sort of breath of fresh air or breathing spaces is Putin. Obviously, the old quote that makes me think about NATO, that a lot of Russians do feel about it, is that, you know, it was created to keep the Americans in, the Germans down and the Soviets out. Right. And sort of to that extent, NATO has been incredibly effective. But again, the whole point being that you. The United States, whether you agree with it or not, as a European, the US has been the de facto. Well, too sure, actually, I guess, sort of, you know, arbitrator of what happens in Europe. You know, the US Says if you don't do what we want in the security world, you know, we'll pull back it. So the Europeans often capitulate or come to the support of the US after 9, 11.
    (1:04:36)
  • Unknown B
    So that was the only time Article 5 has ever been activated. All the scaremongering from the magazine, it was because the U.S. you know, Europeans activated it to show solidarity with the US in 1971. So it's bizarre. I don't know. I mean. Oh, and the last point I make, actually, is that the UK has a really important decision to make, which is, as I'm sure you saw, you know, the Prime Minister gave a letter to Trump saying you are given a unprecedented state visit Right.
    (1:05:20)
  • Unknown A
    I saw that.
    (1:05:53)
  • Unknown B
    Yeah. I didn't want him to have one in the first place, but that's, you know, six years ago now. But to do it again, that's never happened before. It's unprecedented. It's the first time only we've ever done that. Why are we doing it? To try and play, Kate. Trump's like, he plays the ball with us and we're doing a typical thing UK of sucking up the United States to the point where the head's so far up the ass and it's sick of sake. Let's have.
    (1:05:53)
  • Unknown A
    Well, but now for the uk, you guys have more pressure than ever because. Oh, shit. Actually, I just realized this when you said that any tariffs that Donald Trump applies to the European Union don't apply to the United Kingdom. Right. So the UK now has a huge incentive to suck up to Donald Trump. Yeah, because.
    (1:06:17)
  • Unknown B
    No, but it's more. It's more specific than that. What I'm getting at is that the US you know, the UK sorry, has to either stop pretending like it is 100 with Ukraine and more or less extending and, you know, that what Trump did was terrible and keep the implication, or actually stand by their comments that they are saying about Ukraine and rescind the invitation. Because if you don't do that, either way, you come off as a massive hypocrite and a complete, well, laughingstock. I, you know, if it's the case, I really want to be seen as someone who adheres to what he's talking about. He cannot continue to offer the guy who sold out Ukraine as much as he did a state visit. It goes against every principle that he's talking about. It's such double standards.
    (1:06:38)
  • Unknown A
    I mean, I guess it comes down to, I mean, what is the EU gonna punish the United Kingdom for having that visit? Probably not, but Trump is the kind of guy who where, like, if you pet his head, he's gonna give you, you know, the entire world as long as he thinks you think positively of him. So, I mean, I agree from a moralistic or from like a integrity, dignity, whatever standpoint, like, it's disgusting. But I mean, I understand they have tend to do it because just Trump is so fragile, essentially.
    (1:07:33)
  • Unknown B
    Values versus interests. Right. And it goes back to what you were saying about the European defense thing, like, whether you like Macron or not. I think he has a certain willingness to take risks. Like when he put his arm on.
    (1:07:59)
  • Unknown A
    Trump's army and he corrected him, thank God, because American media is so f. Ing cowardly, they won't correct him on anything. I was so happy to see Macron call him out for that and say, excuse me, we've given more money.
    (1:08:13)
  • Unknown B
    We need leaders like that man. And Sharma wasn't willing to do that. If you saw the way that SAHM sat. No. Stood in their portrait of the White House when he first arrived. He's, like, huddled over, like, little. Little sort of geography teacher with those glasses. Trump's over there, like, giving him the big, you know, look and stuff, and it's just like Kirk just comes off so feeble. I like Macron more because at least he tries to hold stature. It's like when you see them shaking hands. Right. Macron always grabs Trump's shoulder and keeps him at a distance because Trump liked the pool people towards him using his body wave.
    (1:08:25)
  • Unknown A
    Yeah, yeah, yeah, exactly.
    (1:08:58)
  • Unknown B
    So, yeah, I like that. So I don't know, but I do think that a European military isn't necessarily off the cards. Europe has the capacity. We have the know how, we have the capital. What we lack is coordination and an ability to get shit together. If we can't somehow better align what we need to do and be committed to that, even if it means taking risks or, you know, ostracizing certain countries are Hungary who want to pull us back, then, you know, we might have to do that. But I just don't know if the European leaders have a conviction enough for that. So, anyway, you should move to Europe. I think you find yourself more at home here. Where are you actually at the moment?
    (1:09:02)
  • Unknown A
    I live in Miami.
    (1:09:39)
  • Unknown B
    Oh. Oh, wow. That's not a. That's not a. I say all day.
    (1:09:40)
  • Unknown A
    So it doesn't, you know. Yeah, but. All right, well, any final closing thoughts for us might be the last time communication has been open between our country, so.
    (1:09:46)
  • Unknown B
    Well, I mean, it's been fun. I'm actually almost at home, so I was gonna switch over to my laptop so you can actually have a stable picture instead of my chin and my ear or your. Whatever you are. Sorry about that.
    (1:09:54)
  • Unknown A
    Well, this is good. Americans, we don't walk much, so it's nice to see you, you know, out about.
    (1:10:05)
  • Unknown B
    You got secondary anxiety or secondary exercises?
    (1:10:10)
  • Unknown A
    Yeah, secondary exercise. Yeah, There we go.
    (1:10:14)
  • Unknown B
    No, I guess. I mean, my last things. Thoughts, you know, at the end of the day, I think that Europe has to put itself first in a way that we maybe haven't done long enough. We need to be more strategic and shameless in how we do that. I think. You know, I want. I like America in principle. I'm chased by certain things. I don't really think the Second Amendment is that necessary in the 21st century, for example. But you know, we're so far in now to the point, as I said before, Americans are hating Europe and everything about it. And it's a socialist, communist, cesspit, you know, leftist, whatever they call them. Brainwashed, brainwashed that they, you know, it's very sad to see and I think the only way that the American MAGA at least are going to realize how bad this is turning up for them is when it's two days and a fair amount of self employed, self sabotage is going to have to occur before.
    (1:10:17)
  • Unknown B
    You know, I watched a video by Adam Conover, I think it was yesterday and he's actually left and everything. But he made one very, I think, pertinent point, which is there's more you can do than simply just going and speaking or ringing up your representative. Get out there, find an organization or create your own. Get active, right. In terms of political activism and go and vouch the hell out of institutions and places of official whatever, you know, your local town hall or council.
    (1:11:13)
  • Unknown A
    Right.
    (1:11:45)
  • Unknown B
    That's what you can still do. And it's, you know, it's about us not saying go riot necessarily, but do what the people did on the streets in Vermont. That's exactly what needs to continue to do. And that's what I think Americans are really good at and often the British don't do. We're not aggressive enough in standing up for the values that we appreciate and those values are being eroded by the likes of Musk, Trump and Matt. So, yeah, I hope that we have the weather of the storm for the next four years and you and I are going to be very busy, so I hope we can reconvene and do this again. It's great fun. Thanks.
    (1:11:45)
  • Unknown A
    Yeah, thanks a lot for chatting up. See you everyone. Yeah, good luck. Thanks for the exercise and have a good one.
    (1:12:16)
  • Unknown B
    Yeah, well, yeah, you can even find me on my channel if people want to follow me on what I'm doing. But otherwise we'll do this again. Thanks a lot. Have a great rest of your weekend.
    (1:12:21)
  • Unknown A
    Have a good one. Bye.
    (1:12:30)